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The Military Principles of the Archduke Carl in the Context of 
His Intellectual Antecedents and His Military Reality. 
 
The Archduke Carl of Teschen, the premier commander of the Habsburg 
military between 1793 and 1809, is often misunderstood in his inherent 
conservatism as a leader, theorist and historian. Too often he is simply seen 
in the context of his looming contemporaries, Napoleon Bonaparte and Carl 
von Clausewitz. This paper will look to explore the key political, military 
and religious theories that the Archduke studied and the potential impact that 
can be seen in his work, both theoretical and in practice.  
 
The reality is that Carl remained an opponent of unlimited war; the type of 
which he believed had been released by the forces of the French Revolution. 
To counter these new so-called realities, he looked to “limit” the impact of 
war through a combination of rational enlightenment principles, appeals to 
service, and the tenets of Theresian Catholicism. In the end, Carl was to 
respond to the “emotional,” and therefore nationalistic, forces of the Modern 
with Habsburg revanche. Evidence for these conclusions will be drawn 
almost exclusively from primary source material, especially the copious 
work of the Archduke himself.  
 
Taking the field against the French in 1794, the Archduke Carl of Teschen, 
future victor of Stockach and Aspern, and the Monarchy’s most famous 
commander of the age, now holding the rank of Feldzeugmeister assumed 
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command of the army’s reserve corps in Belgium. The war against 
Revolutionary France would begin again. However, despite a great deal of 
effort, the campaign failed and the French permanently removed the 
Habsburgs from the Netherlands, ending Carl’s several month career as the 
province’s governor. Claims of poor health and the political intrigues of the 
Court combined to keep the archduke from a field command in 1795. 
Instead, he dedicated the year to the study of the “military sciences.” During 
this year of semi-retirement Carl completed his first military treatise, titled: 
On the War Against the New Franks.1 Measuring the limited successes and 
glaring failures that the Austrians had experienced up to 1794, he puzzled 
over how the poorly disciplined and equipped French could defeat 
professional Austrian troops and commanders. Part of his answer was that 
the generals had lazily restricted themselves to a defensive war based on 
lines-of-communication. But that was not the key, for Carl felt that: 
“...ignorance, indolence, and egotism are to blame for our misfortunes.”2  
 
The following paper will make an attempt at a brief survey of some of 
Archduke Carl’s main intellectual efforts to shape the future of war for the 
Habsburg Monarchy. This influence, despite its counter-intuitive – at least to 
the modern minds’ – effort to stem what appeared to be the progressive 
change brought by the Revolution, had a subtle but import impact. As will 
be made clear, the archduke was always the product of his time and place, 
and while a man of conscience and inclined to reform, he was anything but a 
modernist. To see this we will look briefly at his intellectual antecedents and 
his writings about strategy. Carl was a clear product of these ideas and 
institutions, as was the Monarchy itself; his notion of reform, even change, 
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being more in the nature of Burke rather than a dreaded Robespierre or 
Napoleon.  
 
Carl began his formal education at the age of five with his two older 
brothers, Franz (the future emperor) and Ferdinand. His chief tutors were 
Count Franz Colloredo and the Marquis Federigo Manfredini.3 The tutors 
presented the young Habsburgs with two most important intellectual currents 
then in existence within the Monarchy. The “Theresian” Baroque 
represented an older view of the sixteenth century Counter-Reformation and 
devout Catholicism. In contrast the “Josefinian” enlightenment, dominated 
by a state oriented utilitarian rationalism, attempted to remove the 
emotional, personal, and therefore erratic element of leadership. The result, 
according to the historian Reinhold Lorenz, was a virtual contest between 
the “heart and the mind.”4 Carl would draw inspiration and examples from 
both intellectual schools of thought, and stands near the beginning of the 
larger conservative Catholic, intellectual movement that remains to the 
present. Another significant influence at this time was the ex-Jesuit and later 
Archbishop of Vienna, Count Sigismund Hohenwart. The personal choice of 
Maria Theresa, his post made him instructor to Franz and Carl. Later, 
Hohenwart became Carl’s primary history teacher and imparted his 
“philosophic spirit” on the young man.5 Under these three men Carl’s 
personal development was “restricted to within narrow borders.” In other 
words, the enlightened – read rational – but conservative education now 
considered ideal for children of the Imperial family.6  
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Of great impact, and likely first given Carl by his tutor Hohenwart, were the 
works of Justus Lipsius, the great Dutch Neo-stoic author.7 The Neostoic 
believed that the state must stand against all the extremes of nationalism and 
unjust expansion, preferring to take a “cosmopolitan” position. For the 
Neostoic nothing took place by chance, but rather everything followed 
Providence in a set scheme, the individual remaining consistent in his 
service to the state. In sum, Lipsius called for an: “exceedingly severe, 
controlled manliness in the Stoic mold, in short for a character anchored in 
reason.”8 A commander, entrusted with the responsibility of preserving the 
army, was only to enter battle after great consideration, and then only rarely. 
The physical representation of self-control was in Lipsius’ insistence that 
when a general chose battle, he must hold back a strong reserve.9 For the 
archduke the notion of the Neo-stoic and its restraints seem to have always 
rung true. 
 
Lipsius, also an important source for the Dutch military reformer Maurice of 
Nassau, emphasized discipline as the foundation of a professional army.10 
He classified wars as being either just or unjust, the determining factor 
resting on whether the instigator had a just cause and a just objective. 
Justification was secured through opposition to tyrants or the re-conquest of 
unlawfully taken territories. Because the ruler decided for or against war, it 
was something he had to weigh carefully, first driving the “war-mongers” 
from his court. Finally, Lipsius stated clearly that the lone objective of war is 
peace.11 In dealing with the human element of an army, Lipsius upheld 
discipline as the tonic for the restoration of order and morale. The general 
achieved this goal through the use of frequent drill, strict regulations, and 
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obedience generated by rewards and punishments. Applied correctly, Lipsius 
felt this would lead to a “moral regeneration” of the soldiery and a new 
mentality of service.12  
 
In the same vein as his Neostoic mentality we find Carl’s commitment to 
Christianity. Along with the numerous documents concerning military 
affairs, he also took time to comment on the Gospels in a pamphlet titled 
“Religious Considerations.”13 This strong influence came to the archduke 
from several sources. The first was the nature of the Monarchy’s vision of 
Catholicism under which he grew up, with its emphasis on the absolute 
nature of Heaven and subservience to it.14 Carl’s tutor Hohenwart would also 
have conveyed much the same notion, hence his choice for the job by Maria 
Theresa.15 Finally, the archduke’s Neostoicism meshed with his Christian 
notions of duty and fatalism. In a detailed fashion, the archduke attempted to 
provide insight into the fundamental meanings of the four books of the New 
Testament. The theme of service runs through out the “Considerations,” 
instructing the reader of the importance of obeying God’s “Eternal Law.” 
This law, according to the archduke, called for a one to love his fellow man 
and attempt to “do right” by him. This, Carl asserted, was the only road to 
God and a just life, not the existing humanistic spin on religion and 
especially not the overt secularism of the Aufklärung.16 
 
Carl’s dogmatic Catholicism becomes most evident in his repugnance at 
war’s violence, especially the new, revolutionary form of warfare. On a 
number of occasions he makes it clear that he neither seeks war nor its 
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glories. The primary example comes at the beginning of the Fundamentals 
of the Higher Art of War where the archduke clearly states that the: “greatest 
evil that can befall a nation is war,” it was a crisis that called for the general 
to act quickly in order to achieve a favorable peace.17 Carl supports this 
assertion with a quote from Tacitus: “only rarely is a bad peace made better 
through war.”18 This does not mean that war itself was illegal, or that it 
could always be avoided, but rather that warfare required limitations and a 
delineating set of principals. 
 
Carl’s first serious work on operations, The Fundamentals of the Higher Art 
of War encompassed the eighteenth century notion of “limited warfare” and 
the unwillingness to evoke the full physical energies of one state against 
another. A general did not look to the annihilation of an opponent, but to 
force him into “offering terms.”19 The commander was to obtain success 
through the application of “decisive blows” (entscheidende Schläge) against 
a specified “decisive point” (Punkt). Carl felt this could be best achieved by 
uniting all available forces, his stated fundamental operational principle in 
the art of war. This massing of force applied in all circumstances and 
required scrupulous observance. On a less strategic note the archduke 
designated the specific types of troops best suited for varying terrain. 
He preferred that an army consist primarily of regular infantry, as it 
was the most flexible among the varieties of geography. Cavalry had the 
mission of covering the flanks and delivering the “decisive blow” at the 
end of a battle while the artillery’s function was to act in a supporting 
role.20 
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Carl established that there were two forms of war: the defensive and the 
offensive. The difference was simple. A general that had a superiority of 
troop strength and a distinct geographical advantage took the offensive. He 
took the defensive only when placed at a distinct disadvantage. Switching to 
the offensive later, which was the goal of an active defense, became 
increasingly difficult as it required a change in the states’ “political will” 
(politischen Verhältnissen).21 The basis of a campaign was the operation’s 
plan, which determined the “line” of advance and communications, referred 
to as the “operation’s line” (Operationslinie). Whether on the defensive or 
the offensive, the security of this line remained paramount, as it insured the 
flow of supplies and allowed for a secure withdrawal. If the enemy 
threatened or cut the operation’s line, the army would be forced into a 
disadvantageous retreat without battle.22 The goal of the offensive was to 
thwart the enemy’s plans while gaining a clear superiority through the 
occupation of “key places.” These key places were geographic points of 
significance, such as fortresses or road junctions. The advance was to be 
cautious, with the operation’s line kept short. Because the defender had the 
advantage of fighting on home terrain, an advancing force required flanking 
detachments to guard against any “trickery” on the part of the enemy.23 
 
Carl believed that the fortress presented the best strategic point for the 
creation of an operation’s base, the “key place,” whether on the defensive or 
offensive. Because these structures were so powerful, they dominated the 
placement of base lines. The fortress’s great tenability enhanced the defense 
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of the line-of-operations, and in defeat it secured that line. On the defense 
fortresses covered the main approaches into the state while on the offensive 
they acted as a base of operations. If an enemy fortress sat astride the line of 
advance, or operation’s line, the army halted and initiated a formal 
investment. Because of its utility, states placed fortresses at strategic points, 
such as the juncture of road or river networks. The location, size and number 
of fortresses also determined the offensive capacity of an area, as they 
provided a pre-made base line. The incorporation of a fortress in the line-of-
communications was significant as it provided greater security in retreat and 
gave the army a point to rally.24  “Without these cautions,” the archduke 
stated, “the continuation of the advance and the fortunes of war 
(Waffenglücks) would weaken and then dissolve.”25 The emphasis that Carl 
placed on the use of the fortress was representative of his primarily 
defensive-oriented mentality.26 
 
Supply was, for Carl, a critical operational concern that faced a commander 
in war, and second only to the “key” points.  A general’s first responsibility 
at the outbreak of hostilities, even before the creation of a strategic plan, was 
the preparation and placement of supply depots. The general designated a 
primary line-of-operations (Hauptoperationslinie) that lead back from the 
army over a good road network to a series of fortresses or protected points. 
These pre-designated and protected points were the base from which the 
army operated.27 Carl believed that the careful accumulation and 
transportation of stores permitted greater operational flexibility and strategic 
security.28 The field commander’s primary concern was the movement of 
supplies and the protection of his magazines. As a rule he coordinated his 
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movements to provide for the protection of supply columns and depots. Carl 
felt that the operation’s base should sit parallel to the enemy’s position, 
which allowed for the fewest possible threats. The army could then advance 
on a line perpendicular to the opponent’s base line. By placing the army 
between the base and the enemy the general secured his line-of-operations. 
The archduke generally discouraged broad flanking maneuvers for the 
simple reason that they exposed one’s own line-of-communications.29  
 
When the operation’s line changed, then the influence of the surrounding 
region on the army did so as well. This resulted in necessary adjustments to 
the base line and the line-of-communications. The commander determined if 
the points once forming the original operation’s base remained essential for 
the rest of the war’s conduct, or whether they had only exerted an influence 
over that operation. Carl labeled the first type of point a “key to the region” 
insisting the army’s permanently sustain a line to it. He defended secondary 
points only when they offered a clear superiority and that single key point 
was not decisive. These points were also crucial in the case of retreat 
because the army would fall back upon them.30 
 
In conjunction with these depots the archduke dealt with foraging, which he 
labeled as the act of acquiring the necessary supplies for men and horses. He 
drew a difference, however, between supplies taken by foraging and that 
drawn from the actual magazine, because troops acquired forage locally.31 
Before sending out detachments to forage the exact needs of the army were 
determined and the region given a thorough reconnaissance. Carl estimated 
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that most theatres of operation would have half of all available land under 
cultivation and two-thirds of that would have crops. The archduke set the 
responsibility for the gathering of forage at the regimental level, with all 
foraging parties to be led by staff officers in order to reduce pillaging by 
potentially licentious troops.32 While local acquisition was always possible, 
it was best that an army should carry what it could with it, acquiring the rest 
as it moved forward. Further, Carl emphasized that it was essential to pay 
with bills or cash for supplies acquired locally, because by using free 
purchase and quick payment magazines would always be full. This system 
kept the local inhabitants at peace and avoided exhausting the area in which 
the army operated. The archduke felt this policy limited the potential for 
partisans to rise up in the army’s rear areas. Carl would write mournfully in 
his history of the War in Spain of the example of the French, and the disaster 
that their endemic pillaging brought. Conversely he held up Wellington’s 
very successful example of local purchase of supplies with cash as the 
ideal.33  
 
An example of the fear of provoking the forces of nationalism and 
destruction came in the Second Reform Period (1805-09) were Carl, again 
president of the Monarchy’s War Department, concentrated primarily on the 
sphere of tactical and strategic restructuring.34 Despite the changes that the 
Revolution had apparently brought about in military practice, Carl remained 
conservative in outlook. At no time did he hope to create or copy the radical 
changes carried out by the French. To build a national army similar to the 
one France fielded after 1792 would have required a paradigmatic shift in 
the political and social structure of the Monarchy.35 Carl’s notion of military 
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change remained confined within the limits of in his rational, supra-national 
dynastic orientation. The archduke’s idea was not to replace the old way, but 
instead looked to create an improved system, borrowing from the new where 
possible or unavoidable.36 Unwilling to tap into the potential Pandora’s Box 
of nationalism, Carl preferred to raise morale and motivation among the 
troops by building upon a combination of “character and education.”37 
 
A single, tactical example of the archduke’s rejection of many of the newer 
French innovations can be seen in how Carl viewed the rise of open-order 
fighting, or skirmishing. For him it represented an anomaly of the Wars of 
the French Revolution. He saw the genesis of these new methods as a 
combination of necessity and the French “national character.”38 This change 
resulted from the fact that the French Army had been composed quickly and 
without the training considered standard at the time, and therefore forced the 
French to fight in “open order.” Out of this necessity they created a new 
system, and because of its apparent successes, Carl responded to it.39  
 
Carl found this tactical dispersal of strength a violation of the principle of 
unity, undermining any chance for a decisive victory. Allowing for the use 
of a large percentage of men to skirmish (herumschwärmend) created the 
danger of being caught dispersed by an attacking enemy.40 Because of this 
the archduke did not believe that open fighting could be decisive on the 
battlefield, but he conceded that when facing an opponent using this tactic, 
one had to counter it with the deployment of skirmishers. The number of 
men committed would remain small, however, just enough to counter the 
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enemy.41 Carl saw the dispersal of troops, however few, as a risk because an 
enemy attack in column would not allow for their return, and might prove 
decisive. The men fighting in open order were useful chiefly in tiring and 
demoralizing the enemy, but the real decision in the battle would come in 
the end from an army’s overall strength, types of troops, and use of terrain.42  
 
The difference between open order and the tightly controlled line-of-battle 
possessed some psychological importance as well. Carl felt the key element 
in keeping a soldier from becoming crazed or shaken with fear was the 
imposition of constant and blind obedience (Gehorsam). This meant that 
troops in a sound formation could not be “broken” by the skirmishers, 
because each soldier gained strength from his comrades. On the other hand 
the lone soldier was prone to the “emotional” effects of battle, isolated and 
susceptible to counter-attack. So while the new French system had 
succeeded in a few isolated battles, the ability to replace their losses was the 
real reason for their victories.43  
 
Carl felt that the Wars of the French Revolution had produced a time when 
the decisiveness of the strategic advantage was greater than ever before. 
There was the movement of massed troops in a fashion previously thought 
impossible, and the ability to replace losses made tactics even more 
subservient to strategy. Campaigns of a few weeks could produce results that 
would previously have taken years. Also, that while some traditionally 
important strategic points had lost their value, others had become more 
important.44 
	   13 
 
Despite this the archduke still believed the principles of strategy retained 
their original spirit (Geist), allowing for the design of a specific system for 
each state. He wanted these principles to provide instruction, but he added 
that they were not dogmatic, because that would be both wrong and 
restrictive. Future leaders entrusted with armies needed to have the freedom 
to act once instructed in the rules of strategy. He emphasized not only the 
development of fortresses and the army, but also interior lines-of-
communication like bridges, roads, canals, depots, and magazines. The close 
maintenance of these arteries must either be a maxim for an empire, or a 
matter of decline. The reason, Carl insisted, for France’s success at the end 
of the eighteenth century was its concentration on the “principles of the 
defensive system” with which it had subjugated all of Europe.45  
 
The outcome of all of Carl’s work is hard to accurately measure. It is clear 
that even without the writings of the archduke, the Monarchy would have 
gone into the period between 1815 and 1847 with a conservative, if not 
reactionary mind-set. Who read the archduke and to what degree his ideas 
were absorbed cannot be given a number. That said, the Austrian military 
establishment did put its efforts, albeit always limited by financial stinginess 
of the first degree, into a regular army and traditional fortresses. The army 
remained multi-national, but not multi-cultural, rather it was something a 
“School of the Empire” (versus the “school of the nation” concept). Its fear 
of nationalism prompted the policy whereby regiments during this time were 
often located out of the national area recruited and regularly switched billets. 
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As for the fortress, since the Monarchy saw Italy as the key to the future 
after 1815, it placed its limited spending in the four forts of the 
“Quadrilateral,” Verona, Legnano, Mantua and Pesciera.46 While a several 
more fortresses existed prior to 1847, they all suffered heavily from any real 
funding or maintenance. 
 
In the end Carl’s vision of the Army, as a stoically service oriented tool of 
the Monarchy, remained. For him the non-organic nature of this polyglot 
state required a military, but more as a policing force then an engine for 
progressivism. That the miserly, often vainglorious men that followed him 
failed to take this mission seriously, and to deal with the Army in a 
humanely Christian way, is another story.47 
 
Lee W. Eysturlid         IMSA 
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